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ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND STRUCTORAL UNEMPLOm: 
REFUGEES IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE 
Colin Murray 
The problem in Southern Africa is basically not one 
of race, but of nationalism, which is a world-wide 
problem. There is a white nationalism, and there 
are several black nationalisms ... My Governmentts 
principal aim is to make it possible for each nation, 
black and white, to achieve its fullest potential, 
including sovereign independence, so that each 
individual can enjoy all the rights and privileges 
which his or her community is capable of securing for 
him or her; 
(~ik Botha, United Nations, July 1976) (1) 
Our burden is this. We are trapped. Our hands are 
tied. We have no right to seek work for ourselves 
wherever we want to go. We are supposed to stand 
around here maybe three months, five or six months or 
longer, waiting for work that never comes. When you 
go to Bloemfontein you spend your own money on the bus 
fare. You might get a job sometime, if you're luclq, 
but when you have to get fixed up at the pass office at 
Bloemfontein you are chased away. They say you've got 
no right to seek work for yourself: 'Get back to 
Onverwacht and wait there!! We are men with families, 
we have children going to school. We need money for 
everything. We ask how can we manage to raise our 
families and feed them and keep the children in school 
when our hands are fastened like this? 
 l lack work-seeker, Onverwacht, July 1980) 
Outside Thaba Nchu in the Orange Free State, on the main highway to Bloemfontein, 
there is a sign m k e d  Uitzicht, pointing to the south-west. The public road is wide, 
rough and heavily rutted. Long before it reaches Uitzicht, which is a small railway 
siding near the Rusfontein dam, it passes through a gap in a low ridge of hills 
crossing the western bounda,ry of the Thaba,Nchu reserve. Beyond that gap, 12 
kilometres from Thaba Nchu town, lies one of the largest resettlement slums in South 
Africa. It is known officially as Onverwacht, but the people who live there also 
call it Botshabelo, Place of Refuge. It was bsuren veld in May 1979. Today it is a 
vast paxade of shacks and tents and numbered toilet stands, occupied by more than one 
hundred thousand people. Why? 
Some of the other sink holes of immiseration i n  South Africa - Limehill i n  
Kwazulu, Dimbaza, Thornhill and Glenmore i n  the Ciskei - are already notorious. So 
also are some of the "squatter" camps peripheral to  the industr ial  conurbations - 
Crossroads i n  the western Cape and the Winterveld to  the north-west of Pretoria,  on 
the edge of one piece of the jig-saw of Bophuthatswana. (2) These places, i n  the i r  
variety and complexity, r e f l ec t  complementaxy aspects of contemporary South African 
real i ty.  On the one hand, vast numbers of black South Africans - perhaps 3 million 
. by 1980 - have been forcibly relocated from "white1' South Africa t o  remote and 
isolated dumping grounds i n  the Bantustans. And many more such dumping sounds appear 
every year - except that  they remain unlcnown and inaccessible t o  most South Africans, 
black and white, l e t  alone to  the outside world. On the other hand, as  structural 
unemployment r i s e s  and the vicious sp i ra l  of rural  poverty continues, thousands of 
"redundant" Africans f i l t e r  in to  the dormitory towns and the "squatter" camps on the 
edges of the industr ial  areas, i n  the desperate search fo r  employment. There they 
are harassed by municipal police - the hated "blackjacks" - or, i n  the case of the 
Winterveld, by Bophuthatswana police. 
The policy of ethnic nationalism, represented i n  the above quotation from a 
speech to  the UN by Pik Botha i n  1976, involves the imposition of ten different 
"national" ident i t ies  which are supposed both to  embrace all black South Africans and 
to  divide them i n  the achievement of the i r  pol i t ica l  aspirations. Integral to  th i s  
policy i s  the restructuring of the African population, both i n  respect of the i r  formal 
alienation, the i r  conversion into "foreigners11 and "guest-workers" i n  the country of 
the i r  b i r th ,  as  has already happened to  citizens of Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana 
(1977) and Venda (1979), and as  w i l l  shortly happen t o  ci t izens of the Ciskei; and 
i n  respect of the i r  physical relocation from llwhite" South Africa to  the i r  various 
l'homelandsll. Above all, it  i s  those identif ied as redundant to  the "white" economy 
who are relocated i n  t h i s  way: the unemployed, the unskilled, those without Section 
10 r ights  of residence i n  "white11 South Africa; and the "economically inactive1' - 
women, children, the elderly, the sick and infirm. A recent computer projection by 
Charles Simkins shows that,  although the South African s t a t e  has been unable in  an 
absolute sense t o  reverse the t ide  of immigration from the Bantustans into the common 
area, i t  has successfully enforced over the l a s t  twenty years a re la t ive  concentration 
of the domestic black population i n  the Bantustans - 35.6 per cent of men and 43.3 per 
cent of women i n  1960, 42.0 per cent of men and 52.6 per cent of women i n  1970, 46.3 
per cent of men and 55.9 per cent of women i n  1980. (3) 
I n  terms of the sheer scale of population removals which have taken place, 
and i n  terms of the physical concentration of large numbers of people i n  small areas, 
events i n  the Orange Free Sta te  (OFS) i n  the l a s t  ten years perhaps best  exemplify the 
way i n  which po l i t i ca l  boundazies are manipulated in  order to  export unemployment, t o  
disclaim welfare responsibilit ies,  to  suppress c lass  consciousness, to  promote inter- 
ethnic confl ict  and t o  maintain vicarious control of the labour force through the 
Bantustan administrations. The story concerns four places: Qwaqwa, the t iny  
"homeland1' of the "South Sotho national unit" i n  the north-eastern corner of the OFS 
(see map), which has a limited form of self-government; Thaba Nchu, an isolated 
enclave of the Republic of Bophuthatswana i n  the 035; Kromdraai, a large settlement 
of " i l lega l  squattersf1 within Thaba Nchu whioh s e w  up during the 1970s and was razed 
to  the ground i n  the second half of 1979; and Onverwacht, a new slum t o  the west of 
Thaba Nchu which was planned i n  1979 to  develop in to  a South Sotho "city" of 200,000 
people by the year 2000. (4) It is  already serving as  a commuter-dormitory for  )blacks 
employed i n  Bloemfontein and as  a dumping ground f o r  blacks expelled from "white" towns 
and f a m s  all over the OFS. A t  present Onverwacht i s  administered from Bloemfontein 
by the Black Affairs Commissioner on behalf of the South African Bank Trust. It w i l l  
i n  due course be taken over by the Qwaqwa government. 
Qwaqwa - otherwise the magisterial d i s t r i c t  'of Witzieshoek - i s  a tiny, 
barren and mountainous area of 48,000 hectares. On the south-west i t  i s  bounded by 
the steep crags of the Drakensberg, close t o  the points on the Lesotho border at wkich 
amed insurgents of the self-styled Lesotho Liberation Army have in f i l t r a t ed  over the 
past year. The eastern boundary i s  part  of the main Drakensberg esc-ment, running to  
the north-east - the watershed of the Namahali  lands) and Tugela rivers which 
separates the OFS from Natal. The north-western boundary of 'Qwaqwa is a long mountain 
spur ending in a high cliff which overlooks the capital of Phuthaditjhaba and gives 
the Bantustan its present name. 
After the Difaqane, Witzieshoek was occupied by Chief Oetsi and his Kholokoe 
followers. But the encroaching Boers complained of frequent cattle-raiding by Oetsi's 
people, and the Kholokoe were driven out by a commando under J. M. Orpen in 1856. In 
1867 Moshoeshoe's brother, lvlopeli, was given permission by the Volksraad to settle 
there, as part of the initial peace dispositions of the second Sotho-Boer war. (5) 
In 1873 a section of the Tlokwa under Koos Mota were allowed to settle, in the eastern 
part of the reserve. Thereafter the history of Witzieshoek is only patchily recorded. 
By 1916 the reserve was already over-crowded, eroded and impoverished; and a familiar 
pattern of out-mig~ation had been established. From 1936 various "betterment" 
proposals were put into effect, involving the fencing of =able and grazing areas and 
the culling of livestock. Strong popular resistance to these measures culminated in 
the 1950 Witzieshoek rebellion and violent retaliation by the South African state. (6) 
Consistently with the original territorial demarcation and with the policy 
of the Nationalist Government, two Tribal Authorities were constituted in 1953, for 
the Kwena and Tlokwa tribes, respectively, under the Bank Authorities Act of 1951. 
A Territorial Authority was constituted in 1969 and a Legislative Assembl in 1971, 
and the Bantustan was given limited powers of self-government in 1974. (77 Elections 
were held in 1975 and 1980: in each case the Dikwankwetla party under Kenneth Mopeli 
won an overwhelming victory. But only 20 of the 60 members of the legislative assembly 
are elected in this way. The other 40 members are nominated by the two tribal - 
authorities, 26 by the Kwena and 14 by the Tlokwa. Constitutionally the cabinet mst 
include both tribal chiefs. Yhe Chief Minister himself is ranffoane ,(father's younger 
brother) to the present Kwena tribal chief, Motebang Mopeli, who is also Minister of 
Health, so that the internal politics of Qwaqwa are dominated by the ruling Mopeli 
family. The elections of March 1980 were characterized by an overwhelming absence of 
participation throughout the single 20-member constituency which represents the "South 
Sotho national unit" and by subsequent allegations of corruption against the 
Dikwankwetla party. (8) 
The "South Sotho national unit" is officially cotemunous with the de .iure 
population of Qwaqwa, i.e. "those sections of the population of the RSA and former 
homelands of the RSA which, owing to origin and ethnic ties, axe regarded as citizens 
of the homeland of Qwaqwa". (9) However, according to the census figures showing the 
de facto distribution of the 1.36 million people comprising the "South Sotho national 
unit" in 1970, only 24,000 (less than 2 per cent) were at that time resident in Qwaqwa, 
the Bantustan with which that population is officially associated; 8.4 per cent were 
in other Bantustans, mainly the Transkei and Bophuthatswana; and 90 per cent were in 
"white" South Africa (two-thirds of these in the OFS, one-third in the southern 
~ransvaal) . (10) The estimated de jure population of Qwaqwa in mid-1978 was 1.79 
million. (11) Far more important than the absolute increase in numbers are the changes 
which have taken place in the de facto distribution of this population. Qwaqwa has 
experienced an influx on a staggering scale. Its de facto population was estimated 
to be 200,000 in 1977 (12), 250,000 in 1978 (13), and 300,000 in 1980. (14) Assuming 
this latest estimate to be reasonably accurate, mean population density if now at 
least 1,613 persons per square mile or 622 persons per square kilometre, compared with 
54 persons per square kilometre in 1970. (15) In fact, the population density in the 
settled areas is much higher than this, since many parts of Qwaqwa axe too steep for 
grazing let alone for human habitation. Residents describe the place as one big 
location. It is rural, after all, only in the sense that it lacks urban infrastructure. 
With some degree of understatement, Benbo observed in 1978 that "the country is over- 
populated in relation to asmilable employment opportunities, is poorly situated with 
regard to the industrial areas and markets of Southern Africa, has no notable mineral 
or agricultural riches, while a lack of capital and a topography which makes the 
development of infrastructure exceptionally costly and difficult are some of the most 
important factors retarding economic development". (16) 
There are no reliable figures to indicate where the immigrants into Qwaqwa 
have come from. I would guess that perhaps 60 per cent have come off white fasms, 
particularly in the northern,eastern and north-western districts of the OFS; and the 
remaining 40 per cent from the towns within an arc approximately described by 
Harrismi th, Vereeniging, Klerksdorp. Wesselsbron and Bloemfontein. By 30 June 1976 
the Department of Bantu Administration and Development had "assisted in resettling' 
56,229 South Sotho in Qwaqwa (17) ; and, presumably, many more since then. Otherwise, 
probably the majority of people have moved voluntarily in the sense that they were not 
physically removed by GG (south African government) vehicles but made their own w w  
to Qwaqwa. They have done so for a variety of reasons which reflect the complexity of l 
what is happening in the 0FS as a whole. In view of the prevailing paucity of basic 
information, it is impossible to present a systematic account of this. In many areas, 
though not uniformly, farmers are cutting down on their labour, expelling squatters 
and the few remaining labour tenants, and refusing to accommodate the families of fasm 
workers whose sons have taken up contracts in the mines or elsewhere. Correspondingly, l 
in response firstly to conditions on the faslns which vary a great deal but are for the 
most part appalling, and secondly to the prospect which opened up in the 1970s of 
employment on the mines for higher wages, many individuals and their families have 
decided to set up a base in their "homeland1f and to search for employment as mig~ant l 
labourers in the towns. That they continue to do this in the face of very high 
unemployment within Qwaqwa is an indication of the conditions from which they have l 
come and of the Ciesperate search for security. A shack in Qwaqwa, put together with 
corrugated sheeting at high second-hand prices, albeit with no arable or grazing land, 
with no urban infrastructure, no employment and minimal social services (except schools, 
which are many and attract boarders from Kroonstad, Welkom and other OFS towns), 
represents the first and only secure home that most immigrant families have experienced. 
Immigrants were also responding to a sustained campaign to encourage South 
Sotho to come "home". This was initiated in the early and middle 1970s by the Qwaqwa 
government together with Chieftainess 'MaMpoi, mother of Chief Motebang Mopeli. Since 
immigrants are directly incorporated into the existing tribal hierarchy and immediately 
subject to a network of bureaucratic controls connected with access to residential 
sites, to local jobs and services and to the labour bureau, the effect of this campaign 
has been to establish hegemony over a political constituency which would otherwise have 
remained dispersed and fragmented and wholly out of reach of the Dikwankwetla party 
machine. Thus do the Bantustan leaders conspire in the process of immiseration. 
In 1978 Mopeli rejected the option of "independence", but said that it might 
be considered if the size of the Bantustan were increased to half of the OFS. (18) 
He had earlier been quoted as saying that the ultimate aim of Qwaqwa was to "form a 
union with Lesotho which will include the South Sotho living in the Transkei and 
Eastern Free State". (19) This a.spiration is taken seriously neither by the South 
African government nor by the Lesotho government. Pending satisfactory settlement of 
its own claims to "conquered territory", which is quite unlikely at present, Lesotho 
will not find it attractive to absorb another 48,000 hectares, Qwaqwats present land 
area, together with its resident population of more than a quarter of a million people, 
since Lesotho already faces its own crisis *of structural unemployment. (20) An 
additional derisory area of 14,000 hectares of compulsorily purchased white farm land 
is due to be added to Qwaqwa under the 1975 consolidation proposals. Having 
substantially failed in his bid for extra land in the OFS, Mopeli's strategy has been 
to articulate the grievances of South Sotho minorities in other Bantustans. For 
example, the Qwaqwa cabinet declared Transkei Independence Day, 26 October 1976, as a 
day of mourning for many thousands of South Sotho of the Herschel and Maluti districts 
who were not consulted about their future status and whose subsequent secessionist 
impulse has been harshly suppressed by the Transkei authorities. (21) Otherwise, 
Mopeli has taken a particular interest in the predicament of South Sotho immigrants 
into Thaba Nchu. 
Because of its long-standing association with the Seleka Rolong, a branch 
of the Tswana, Thaba Nchu became "independent" as a territorial fragment of 
Bophuthatswana in December 1977. The history of this association is a fascinating 
one. The Bslrolong fled from the ravages of the Difaqane along the Vaal river and 
settled at Thaba Nchu in 1833, apparently as vassals of Moshoeshoe, although there are 
at least three different interpretations of the transaction that took place. (22) 
Their chief, Moroka, who a l l i e d  himself with the Voortrekkers f i r s t  against Mzilikazi 
and then against Moshoeshoe, achieved effect ive po l i t i ca l  independence a f t e r  the 
collapse of the Orange River Sovereignty i n  1854. A s  a r e su l t  of a b i t t e r  dispute 
over the succession to  Moroka, however, Thaba Nchu w a s  annexed by the OFS i n  1884, 
and i t s  lfcommonll land appropriated. The remaining t e r r i t o ry  of the Barolong, under 
freehold tenure, largely disintegrated i n  the following twenty years through the 
al ienat ion of individual t i t l e s  to  whites. (23) Many Barolong were evicted and 
dispossessed: Morokal S biographer, S. M. Molema, remarked tha t  about 10,000 "went 
t o  l i v e  i n  Government and municipal locations i n  the various towns of the Orange Free 
S ta te  and elsewhere, and thus swelled the African urban population, which seems t o  be 
the problem of the mid-Twentieth century i n  South Africa". (24) 
Solomon Plaa t je  recorded the fur ther  misery and d i s t r e s s  which the 1913 Land 
Act i n f l i c t ed  on Africans i n  the OFS. He describes a public meeting a t  Thaba Nchu 
on 12 September 1913 at which "a thousand Natives" were b i t t e r l y  disappointed when 
they were told by the Secretary f o r  Native Affairs,  Edward Dower, t o  acquiesce i n  
t h e i r  eviction and dispossession under the Act. (25) The Beaumont Commission of 1916 
merely crystal l ized the disintegration of Thaba Nchu. (26) I n  h i s  addendum t o  the 
Report of the Natives Economic Commission, 1930-32, F. E. W. Lucas noted tha t  no 
additional land had been s e t  aside f o r  the Barolong, despite the recommendation of an 
1884 commission; tha t  many freehold landowners had got in to  debt and given bonds over 
t h e i r  farms, which resulted i n  the al ienat ion of much land t o  whites and the eviction 
of Africans; tha t  the reserve was over-crowded and over-stocked, vegetation was 
scanty and land erosion very bad; tha t  "large numbers of Basuto and Amaxosa have 
dr i f ted  in to  the d i s t r i c t  from time t o  time and have remained working on the farms"; 
and tha t  the Barolong t r i b a l  system was breaking down, and not much use w a s  being made 
of the chiefs. (27) Since 1936 some steps have been taken t o  reintegrate  the 
fragments of land which constituted the reserve, nearly doubling i t s  s i ze  through the 
acquisit ion of Quota land. A s  a r e s u l t  many people have been r e se t t l ed  i n  Trust 
vi l lages.  Byt the process of consolidation i s  not yet  complete; and there remains 
considerable confusion over whether the boundaries of Thaba Nchu which now appear on 
o f f i c i a l  maps (such as the 1977 edi t ion of the 1: 250,000 topo-cadastral sheets) 
accurately represent the land available to  Africans within Thaba Nchu. 
I The 1970 census recorded an ethnical ly  mixed population i n  the reserve: 
24,300 Tswana, 12,000 South Sotho and 3,600 Xhosa i n  a t o t a l  population of 42,000 (28), 
a l l  po l i t i ca l ly  subordinate t o  the Barolong Tribal Authority. I n  the following years 
many more Basotho l e f t  white farms, the smallholdings round Bloemfontein and the s m a l l  , 
dorps all over the OFS, and dr i f ted  i n  t o  the exis t ing Thaba Nchu "locations" (~oro long,  
Mokwena, Ratlou, etc.) ; t o  resettlement vi l lages known as  Bultfontein I, I1 and 111 (20); 
and t o  the remaining Barolong freehold farms and Trust villages.  A large concentration 
of i l l e g a l  squatters developed to  the north of Thaba Nchu railway s ta t ion  i n  an area 
which became hown as  Kromdraai. It had been demarcated as grazing land, but thousands 
I of people moved there apparently because p lo ts  had been fraudulently "sold1' t o  them o r  
because they had been l ed  t o  believe tha t  stands would be allocated t o  them. According 
t o  a press report,  "It i s  the rejected who come t o  Kromdraai - those who can no longer 
work, those who cannot ' f i x  up t h e i r  passes' - from the small dorps and farms all over 
the Free State.  The authori t ies  of Thaba Nchu ( i n  ~o~hutha tswana)  do not want them and 
say they must go t o  t h e i r  own place - Qwaqwa. But Qwaqwa is  f a r  away and overcrowded 
I 
alreadyft . ( 30) 
I n i t i a l l y ,  an attempt w a s  made t o  deport them to  Qwaqwa. I n  1974, f o r  
example, Mangope w a s  reported t o  have made Bophuthatswana government vehicles 
available t o  the Central Government f o r  t h i s  purpose. (31) A reader of the Bloemfontein 
Friend commented on this i n  1976: "When approaching Thaba Nchu by rail one is  alarmed 
t o  notice the uncontrolled development of the squatter town now generally known as  
Kromdraai. For those who have the welfare of the Black people at heart ,  i t  was a 
great r e l i e f  t o  see Government vehicles transporting these squatters t o  Witzieshoek. 
Black leaders i n  Thaba Nchu were happy t o  see one of t h e i r  major problems so eas i ly  
solved ... It i s  only hoped tha t  the Sotho pol i t ic ians  using these squat ters  f o r  t h e i r  
own po l i t i ca l  gains wi l l  r ea l i ze  what hardships they have caused and axe s t i l l  causing 
t o  innocent people and tha t  they w i l l  have the courage t o  accept responsibi l i ty  f o r  
the problems they are  creating." (32) 
But mass immigration continued, and the issue developed into a confrontation 
between politicians of Bophuthatswana and Qwaqwa, respectively. A Qwaqwa cabinet 
minister complained that South Sotho in Thaba Nchu were discriminated against in 
respect of work permits, residence rights and language of instruction in the schools. 
In turn, he was accused of interfering in the domestic affairs of Bophuthatswana. (33) 
In 1978, the population of Kromdraai was estimated to be 38,000 people. They were 
living in poverty and squalor, in shacks roughly constructed from mud-bricks and 
corrugated sheeting. (34) They were regularly harassed by the Bophuthatswana police 
as "illegal foreigners", and this pressure was intensified shortly after 
"independence". Several massive raids took place in 1978. On 24 April, for example, 
. 301 people were arbitrarily arrested, their children intimidated, their livestock 
dispersed and impounded; some were shot, others were raped. Those charged and 
convicted for squatting were fined R40 or imprisoned for 40 days in Bloemfontein gaol, 
by arrangement with South Africa. Another big raid on 21 December 1978 led to R60 
fines or 60 days' imprisonment. The practice became lucrative for the Bophuthatswana 
authorities. On several occasions, indeed, the South African police intervened to 
persuade the Bophuthatswana police to behave more moderately. Basotho tenants in the 
Thaba Nchu "locations" also complained of exploitation and klarassment by Barolong 
landlords. In May 1978, Mopeli appealed to Mangope to leave South Sotho in Thaba 
Nchu alone until they could be resettled. (35) 
During 1977 and 1978 various negotiations took place between Bophuthatswana 
and Qwaqwa and the South African government over the provision of land for the 
relocation of Basotho from Thaba Nchu. (36) A land swap was arranged by wliich 25,000 
hectares of compulsorily purchased white farms on the east bank of the Modder river 
would be used both to enlarge the Thaba Nchu enclave and to create a South Sotho city 
to the west of it. (37) Removal of the Kromdraai squatters to the area known as 
Onverwacht began in late May 1979 - in winter - and was completed by December of the 
same year. Kromdraai itself reverted to bare hillside, scrub and grazing. Only the 
graveyard remains, and rusting upturned vehicles are scattered across the veld. In 
Onverwacht people were provided with numbered toilet stands and had to build their own 
accommodation from whatever materials they were able to obtain. Most of the shacks 
are haphazardly constructed from corrugated sheeting and they are extremely hot in 
s m e r  and bitterly cold in winter. Basotho were also removed from the Bultfontein 
settlements, from the "locations" in Thaba Nchu and from Barolong farms and Trust 
villages such as Ha Ntsieng near Waghorn station in the east of the reserve, Paradys 
in the north and Dipudungwana in the south. People are still pouring into Onverwacht 
from elsewhere in the O H ,  courtesy of GG. Many others are using Thaba Nchu as a 
staging post for being transferred to Onverwacht, so that the areas in the reserve 
from which Basotho have already been removed have rapidly filled up again. They 
qualify for stands in Onverwacht by producing i) a Qwaqwa citizenship card, ii) a 
valid reference book and iii) a marriage certificate, and by paying R1.OO for the 
allocation. Chief Minister Mopeli, however, is acknowledged as not insisting on 
Sotho identity as a criterion of Qwaqwa citizenship, with the result that there is a 
significant minority in Onverwacht who are identified as members of the Xhosa ethnic 
group but as citizens of Qwaqwa. 
Conditions are very bad. Most families are grossly overcrowded. They live 
in tents or shacks on plots of 30 X 15 metres and s h e  a bucket toilet which may be 
emptied by lorry twice a week. There is no privacy. Water is scarce, despite the 
provision of pipes and tap outlets in three of the four sections occupied by .Tuly 1980. 
There was an outbreak of typhoid early in 1980, denied by officials in Bloemfontein 
and Pretoria. By 9 July 1980 there were 258 "adult" graves and 269 "children's" graves 
in the cemetery: a stark indication of high infant mortality. 
Unemployment is also very high. There are a few local and temporary 
construction jobs with GG at w-s substantially lower than for similar work elsewhere. 
The rate of mine recruitment at Thaba Nchu is well down on previous years, averaging 
about 200 per month in the first half of 1980. (38) About 60 per cent of these men 
come from Onverwacht, but most of them carry  re-engagement guarantee certificates and 
very few novices are recruited. Hardly any white employers visit Onverwacht to engage 
contract labour; those who do often renege on the terms and conditions offered. Even 
when men are recruited through the local office which serves as a labour bureau, they 
are seldom offered, irrespective of their qualifications and experience, anything other 
than unskilled manual labour ("pike en foshel") at wage rates which they cannot afford 
to accept because they cannot feed their families thereby. Many households appear to 
be solely dependent on a pension, a sum of about £50 payable every two months, or on 
the appalling wage of a domestic servant. For example, a woman who is her household's 
sole breadwinner may rise at 4 a.m. in Onverwacht to travel to her employer's home in 
Bloemfontein; she works a 6-day week for which she is paid R25 or R30 a month, out of 
which she must find R12 for the monthly bus ticket before starting to feed her family. 
Residents in Onverwacht spend an enormous amount of time, energy and money in 
surmounting or circumventing the bureaucratic checkpoints that constrain access to 
residential sites, to reference books, to work-seekers' permits, to jobs, to local 
services, to pensions. They bitterly resent the vicious circles which prevent them 
i) from seeking work at all (the soekwerk stamp) and ii) from seeking it outside 
Onverwacht. Men and women trudge daily to the office, an ex-farmhouse several 
kilometres away from the slums, and despair of any prospect of improvement. 
1 Despite all this, the people from Kromdraai in particular express some 
relief because they are no longer subject to arbitrary arrest and intimidation by the 
Bophuthatswana police. In the Qwaqwa election of March 1980 they voted solidly for 
l 
1 the Dikwankwetla party because they believe that Chief Minister Mopeli persuaded the 
1 South African government to provide a refuge for the Basotho who were being harassed 
, fn Thaba Nchu. Mopeli thus gained considerable political credit for leading his 
subjects "out of the land of Egypt into the land of Canam". But he is unable to 
provide land or jobs for them, and this credit may swiftly evaporate as frustration 
and anger intensify in Onverwacht. One focal point of frustration and anger is the 
forced auctions of livestock which have taken place. Another is the schools, which 
I are over-crowded and where facilities are utterly inadequate: 600 students stormed 
the police station at Onverwacht on 11 July 1980. (39) On 14 September, according to 
a press report, two men were arrested by Bophuthatswana security police while Mopeli 
was addressing a crowd of 20,000 at Onverwacht, after rumours of a possible 
I assassination attempt against him. (40) It is not clear why Bophuthatswana police 
I should have been involved. 
One tragic irony of this episode in the appalling story of South Africa's 
internal refigees is that, according to press leaks in 1979, Thaba Nchu has been 
excluded from the Van der Walt Commissionls proposals to consolidate Bophuthatswana. 
"The idea of surrendering Thaba Nchu is certain to bring heartache to the 
Bophuthatswana President, Chief Lucas Mangope, as it has been in the hands of the 
Tswana-speaking Barolong tribe for 150 years. Nearly 70,000 Basotho are reported to 
live in the area today." (41) We still await the report of the Commission and the 
government's reaction to it, but if this is confirmed the boot will be on the other 
foot and thousands of Barolong are likely to be trekking far to the west, to the main 
areas of Bophuthatswana. 
I 
I Qwaqwa's "greatest asset", in Mopeli's view, is its human potential. He has 
also recognized that "At present and in the distant future the people of Qwaqwa will be 
its main export. For that reason the quality of the article must improve so that there 
l is a great demand for it among the industries of Southern Africa". (42) The South 
l Sotho "homeland" will shortly consist of two entirely separate "city-states" - in fact 
grotesquely over-crowded rural slums. Contrary to Mopeli's aspirations, mass removals 
to Qwaqwa and to Onverwacht are a mechanism for the concentration of poverty and 
I unemployment in remote and isolated rural areas. There is absolutely no prospect that 
jobs will be created for these people either locally or at a distance. The Bantustan 
1 
I governments have thus increasingly assumed the function of direct repression of South 
I Africa's relative surplus population. In political terms, the strategy of ethnic 
nationalism has given a vicious ethnic twist to conflicts which might otherwise develop 
along class lines or as part of the wider struggle against white supremacy. In economic 
terms, the effect of the strategy is to maintain, physically intermingled with this 
surplus population, a minimally organized, grossly exploitable reserve army of labour, 
whose wage income is systematically depressed through acute competition for occasional 
unskilled employment. People are preoccupied, of course, with the problems of physical 
survival from day to day. But there are still strong empirical connections - through 
schoolchildren, migrant labourers and the dispersion of families - between the black 
townships in tlwhitefl South Africa and the rural slums in the Bantustans. For this 
reason one may envisage crisis points in the dumping grounds that co-ordinate, to some 
extent, with the crisis points in Soweto, Port Elizabeth and elsewhere. They will, 
inevitably, be staggered in time. The outstanding question, therefore, is not the 
human potential for  development" in Qwaqwa but the human potential for resistance to 
the repressive infrastructure of ethnic nationalism and to the South African state as 
its political sponsors. 
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